

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

26 May 1951

SUBJECT: Tentative Terms of Reference for Proposed NIE
(Formerly Staff Planning Project No. 7);
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF A SOVIET CONQUEST OF
WESTERN EUROPE AND THE NEAR EAST* BEFORE 1953
(for consideration of the Board)

THE PROBLEM

possible gains
To examine the effect on the East-West power position of
a Soviet conquest of Western Europe and the Near East before
1953.

SCOPE

by pockethead
The study would ^{first} present a description or summation of the
potential military and economic accretions to the Soviet bloc
resulting from conquest of the area [under optimum conditions],

* All European continental countries West of the Iron Curtain
(including Yugoslavia), Greece, Turkey, Iran, the Levant, the
Arabian peninsula, and Egypt.

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i.e.: no US counteraction, negligible resistance and destruction by Western armed forces, etc. The study would then examine the numerous known or possible internal and external factors which might deter or prevent full Soviet realization of the area's ^{war} potential, ~~with special emphasis on changes in Soviet capabilities vis-a-vis the US.~~ [Although] ^{will} no attempt should be made to reach conclusions regarding a Soviet intent to overrun Western Europe and the Near East, certain limited conclusions may emerge which would shed light on Soviet intentions, [particularly with respect to the optimum time for a conquest of Western Europe and the Near East and the most advantageous method of achieving it.]

QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

THE ACQUISITION
OF THE TERRITORY OF
(AND RESOURCES)

I. WHAT POTENTIAL MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES COULD THE USSR OBTAIN FROM A CONQUEST OF WESTERN EUROPE AND THE NEAR EAST?

(Disregarding such factors as US counteraction, destruction by retreating Western forces, and interdiction of the conquered area's normal trade with non-Soviet areas.)

A. Military.

1. Removal of a ^{potential military} land threat to the USSR?

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2. Increased capability for launching attacks against the US, the UK ^{and} or other non-Soviet countries?

B. Economic *and Scientific*

1. What would be the gross Western European and Near Eastern ^{stocks, resources, and productive capacity} production of resources and products which could contribute to the Soviet potential for war against the US and UK?
2. In what particular lines would the economic ^{and scientific} potential of Western Europe and the Near East make the greatest contribution to Soviet economic strength?

II. TO WHAT EXTENT AND FOR HOW LONG WOULD VARIOUS INTERNAL FACTORS DETER OR PREVENT FULL SOVIET UTILIZATION OF WESTERN EUROPE AND THE NEAR EAST?

(As in I above, external factors such as US counter-action, etc., would be disregarded.)

A. Military.

1. Overextension of Soviet military forces?
2. Difficulties of organizing and controlling non-Soviet armed forces?
3. Necessity for providing large occupation forces?

B. Economic.

1. Integration of the economics of the two areas?

occupied areas with that of the Soviet orbit

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Including problems of conversion of standards and organization

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